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I. INTRODUCTION
With 21,000 employees'and an annual revenue of 100 billion dollars,
Enron Corp. (Enron)1 ranked seventh on the Fortune 500 in 2001, ahead
of both IBM and AT&T.2 Within a year of achieving this milestone,
Enron's stock fell seemingly overnight from its peak of over ninety dollars
a share to approximately fifty cents a share As a result of this slide, many
of Enron's employees incurred sharp losses in their retirement savings
because their employer-sponsored 401(k) plans4 had over sixty percent of
the assets invested in Enron stock.5

1. Enron was an energy trading company in the nation's largest deregulated market for
electricity and natural gas. Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Running on Empty: Enron
Faces Collapse as Credit,Stock Dive and Dynegy Bolts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at Al.
2. Id At this time, Fortune Magazine dubbed Enron the most innovative company in the
country. Id.
3. Robert O'Brien, Dynegy and ChevronTexaco Slide Along With Plunge in EnronStock,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at C2. At one point, in August 2000, Enron's stock sold for more than
ninety dollars a share. Id. In October 2001, Enron's stock began to decline rapidly after Enron
reported a quarterly loss and allegations surfaced of wrongdoing by company executives. Smith
& Emshwiller, supra note 1. Allegedly, Enron executives, including Enron's Chief Financial
Officer, profited, at the expense of the company and its shareholders, from partnerships that
moved assets on and off Enron's books. Id. On November 28, 2001, credit-rating agencies
downgraded Enron's debt to junk status and Dynegy Inc., a rival of Enron, called off a planned
merger with Enron. Id. Following these announcements, Enron's stock lost about eighty-five
percent of its value as it dropped from approximately four dollars a share to sixty-one cents a
share. O'Brien, supra.A few days later, Enron filed for bankruptcy, the largest bankruptcy filing
in U.S. history. Rebecca Smith, EnronFilesfor Chapter11 Bankruptcy, Sues Dynegy, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 3, 2001, atA3.
4. Established pursuant to section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, a 401(k) plan
allows an employee to voluntarily elect "to make pretax contributions to his or her account with
the plan. Most employers devise plans in which the employer matches the employee's
contributions, commonly with a match rate of 50 percent, usually up to a ceiling such as five or
six percent of compensation." JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRuCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 50-51 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter PENSION LAW].
5. Ellen E. Schultz, Enron Workers Face Losses on Pensions,Not Just 401(k)s, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 19, 2001, at Cl. Moreover, Enron manipulated their traditional employee pension
arrangements to make them dependent on fluctuations in Enron stock. See id. However, Enron
employees with traditional pension arrangements were much better off after Enron's collapse than
Enron employees with 401 (k) plans. See Albert B. Crenshaw, A 401(k) Post-Mortem;After Enron,
Emphasis on Company Stock DrawsScrutiny, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2001, at H01.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss5/2

2

Rothman: 401(k) Plans in the Wake of the Enron Debacle
401(K) PLANS IN THE WAKE OFTHE ENRON DEBACLE

The Enron debacle illustrates6 that 401(k) plans make ineffective
retirement plans and, therefore, threaten the strong public interest of
preserving the institution of retirement. Typically, retired employees
combine income from employer-sponsored retirement plans, Social
Security, and private savings accounts to create a retirement income stream
that meets their retirement needs.7 The expectation ofreceiving this income
stream allows employees to retire from the workforce in a planned and
orderly fashion.8 Accordingly, employers rely on this expectation as a labor
planning tool while society relies on it to createjob opportunities for young
workers. 9
Absent an effective retirement plan, however, many employees lack the
means to retire. 0 This is because employees often depend on using private
employer-sponsored retirement plans to meet their retirement income
needs.11 In this situation, an employee's comfortable retirement hinges on
the financial success ofthe employee's retirement plan. Commonly, 401 (k)
plans serve as primary retirement plans for employees. 2 For these
employees, like14 many Enron employees,13 a 401(k) plan may carry severe
consequences.
Although 401(k) plans are not consistently effective for retirement
savings purposes, the use of a 401(k) plan as an employee's primary

6. Enron represents merely an example of how 401(k) plans can jeopardize an employee's
retirement savings. Other notable examples include Lucent Technologies, Inc. and Ikon Office
Solutions, Inc. See Theo Francis & Ellen Schultz, Enron FacesSuits by 401(k) PlanParticipants,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 23,2001, at CI; see also PENSION LAW, supranote 4, at 53-54 (describing how
employees at Color Tile lost their retirement savings when Color Tile went bankrupt because
Color Tile offered a 401(k) plan that was heavily invested in employer stock and employer real
estate); Steven Greenhouse, Enron'sManyStrands:RetirementMoney, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,2002,
at Cl (quoting Senator Jon Corzine mentioning the further examples of Sunbeam and Waste
Management).
7. See PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 23. In addition, an employee may need to rely on
income from part-time employment during retirement to create a retirement income stream large
enough to meet the employee's retirement income needs. See id.
8. See Patricia E. Dilley, TakingPublicRights Private:The RhetoricandReality ofSocial
SecurityPrivatization,41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 1030 (2000).
9. Id at 1032.
10. See AliciaH. Munnell, The EconomicsofPrivatePensions,in PENSIONLAW, supranote
4, at34.
11. See id. at 34-35.
12. See Colleen E. Medill, The IndividualResponsibilityModel ofRetirementPlansToday:
Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 8-9 (2000).
13. See, e.g., Francis & Schultz, supranote 6 (describing an Enron employee's 401(k) plan
that fell in value from 470,000 dollars to 70,000 dollars after Enron's collapse); Schultz, supra
note 5 (providing an account of an Enron employee whose pension savings, consisting of a 401(k)
plan interrelated with a tradition pension arrangement, dropped from "about $200,000 to a couple
of thousand dollars" after Enron's collapse).
14. See supra notes 6, 13.
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retirement savings plan is becoming more prevalent." Further, the low
administrative and regulatory costs associated with a 401 (k) plan provide
employers with an incentive to sponsor such retirement savings plans."6
Therefore, certain circumstances make 401 (k) plans attractive alternatives
to more reliable pension arrangements. As Enron revealed, however, the
law presently provides employees with inadequate security for their 401 (k)
plans.'"
Ironically, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) 8 regulates 401(k) plans and most other employer-sponsored
employee retirement plans.' 9 Congress enacted ERISA to prevent
employees from losing the retirement benefits employers promised them.20
Congress intended to provide security for employee retirement plans, in
large part, by equipping ERISA with demanding fiduciary rules to govern
plan administration and investment.2 Notwithstanding ERISA's fiduciary
rules and underlying policy, 401(k) plans often place an employee's
retirement at a substantial risk.
This Note describes the threat 401(k) plans pose to the institution of
retirement. Part II will discuss the evolution of the modern concept of
retirement along with the evolution of the private pension system. Part III
will examine why ERISA does not provide adequate protection for an
employee's retirement savings in a 401 (k) plan and how 401 (k) plans may
impact federal retirement policy. Finally, Part IV will suggest judicial and
statutory approaches that may help protect the institution of retirement
from 401 (k) plans.

15. See Medill, supra note 12, at 8-9.
16. See PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 52 (explaining that traditional pensions are often

uneconomic for small employers). In addition, the employee match feature of 401(k) plans lets
employees value employer contributions to their plans on a regular basis. Id. at 51. Further, 401 (k)
plans offer portability to an increasingly mobile workforce. See id. at 52. No law requires an
employer to offer a retirement plan. Crenshaw, supra note 5, at HO1. Fewer than half of the
American workforce is covered by one. Id.
17. See supranotes 6,13; see also supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
18. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974); see generally PENSION LAW, supranote 4, at 89-96.
19. See PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 104-13.
20. Id. at 121.
21. Seeid.at122.
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II.

THE EVOLUTION OF RETIREMENT AND PRIVATE PENSION PLANS

A. From Humble Beginnings to the Retirement Security Dilemma
Historically, most American workers remained in the labor force beyond
their sixty-fifth birthday and did not expect to retire. 2 The relatively recent
social phenomenon of retirement gained a foothold in American society in
the early twentieth century.3 Around this time, the government developed
its first federal social welfare program to provide benefits to Civil War
veterans, their widows, and their children. 4 Also around this time, private
pension plans gradually emerged as a response to economic and social
problems facing the elderly."
By 1930, employers offering pension plans employed about ten percent
of the nonagricultural labor force. 6 For the most part, employers financed
employee pension plans themselves, without contribution from their
employees.27 Employers also regarded pension plans as gratuities and took
careful precautions to ensure that they were not legally obligated to make
pension payments.2" Thus, although employers benefitted from pension
plans by expressing to employees an intention to recognize their long and
faithful service, employers reserved the right to alter or terminate their
employees' pension plans at-will.2 9
The small number of employees covered by pension plans and the
corporate practice of treating pension plans as gratuities kept employee
retirements uncommon in the early twentieth century. 0 Yet, several
innovations soon emerged, increasing the popularity of the notion of
retirement.

22. Dilley, supranote 8, at 1027.
23. PENsION LAW, supra note 4, at 4. Prior to this time, the elderly relied on the
continuation of employment, frugality and savings, the support of family members, charity, or the
poor house for support. William C. Greenough & Francis P. King, Pension Plans and Public
Policy, in PENSION LAW, supranote 4, at 7.
24. Dilley, supranote 8, at 1027.
25. Greenough & King, supra note 23, at 7. By the late nineteenth century, the economic
and social situation of the elderly became a large scale problem as a result of industrialization,
"the dramatic impact of the railways, and the accelerating movement ofAmericato urban centers."
Id.
26. Id. at 8. Not all of the people employed by these employers "were eligible for plan
membership." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 9.
29. IM
30. Employees retiring during this time generally provided for their own retirement through
various types of informal, such as personal savings, or formal, such as privately purchased
annuities, equity-based retirement savings plans. Dilley, supranote 8, at 1029. Less common were
employees who retired relying on employer-provided pensions to meet their income needs. Id.
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First, the enactment of Social Security in 1935 made retirement a
possibility for the middle class.3 In enacting Social Security, Congress
primarily intended to protect people against poverty in old age.32 However,
at a time of sky-high unemployment, Congress also intended for Social
Security to create new jobs.3 Congress envisioned that Social Security
would ease older workers from the workforce in a controlled manner, thus
creating job opportunities for younger workers.34
Likewise, by the mid-1930s, employers realized the potential of
retirement as a labor management tool.35 Accordingly, employers developed
private pension plans to control employee exits from the work force,36
thereby enabling middle-class people to combine income from Social
Security with income from private pension plans and retire without lifestyle
compromises.
Pension plans also developed as a result of union pressure.37 Initially,
unions attempted to meet the old-age needs of members by creating their
own old-age benefit programs.38 As early as 1912, unions began offering
members old-age benefits as a matter of right, rather than as a gratuity.3 9
However, most union plans collapsed with the onset of the Great
Depression. 40 Falling to maintain their own welfare plans, unions struggled
for the next several decades to establish employer-provided pension plans
across an array of industries. 4' During this time, unions advocated for
financial soundness in 42
pension plans while rejecting the gratuity theory as
their underlying basis.
Lastly, federal tax policy contributed to the private pension system's
rapid growth.43 During World War II, the federal tax structure underwent

31. Id at 1026.
32. Id. at 1031.
33. Id. at 1032. Congress enacted Social Security during the Great Depression, a time of
fifty percent unemployment. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1030.
37. See Greenough & King, supra note 23, at 13-15.
38. See id at 12.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 12-13.
41. Id. at 13-15.
42. See id.However, the gratuity theory of employee pension plans survived at least in part
through the mid 1950s. PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 127. The enactment of ERISA effectively
did away with gratuity theory as a basis for employee pensions because ERISA severely limited
an employer's ability to forfeit an employee's pension plan. Id.Today, deferred wage theory is the
accepted description of an employer's pension obligations. Id. at 17. Deferred wage theory
explains an employee's pension as "compensation earned during employment but paid during

retirement." Id
43. See PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 15.
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dramatic changes." These changes caused taxes to pervade society like
never before." Consistent with the government's interest in using
retirement to create jobs, the government exploited the new tax policy to
encourage the private pension system's growth by allowing employers to
instantly deduct contributions to pension plans and also by allowing the
investment yield on plan assets to escape taxation "until the period of
distribution, typically after [an] employee retires." 6 Thus, the government
used tax policy as an incentive for both employers and employees to
embrace pension plans. Indeed, tax policy is still amain factor perpetuating
the private pension system today.47
Accordingly, by the middle of the twentieth century, the advent of
Social Security converged with the development of the private pension
system to create a societal expectation ofretirement. Moreover, employees,
employers, the federal government, and society at large shared an interest
in preserving this expectation because it provided employees with
motivation to work throughout the majority of their lives, and later
encouraged them to stop working in old age.48 However, a few days before
Christmas in 1963, the closing of a Studebaker automobile plant and the
accompanying termination of its pension plan covering 11,000 employees
revealed that employees still could not always depend on their pension
plans for retirement income.49

44. Id.(showing that taxes increased dramatically for both employers and employees during
and after World War II).
45. kd During this time, tensions ran high between industry and labor because employers
competing for workers were reluctant to increase wages. Id.To relieve tensions between industry
and labor, the War Labor Board permitted the establishment of employee pension plans. Id.Thus,
wage stabilization factored into the growth of the private pension system. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id
48. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 1043-44.
49. Michael Allen, The Studebaker Incident andIts Influence on the PrivatePension Plan
Reform Movement, in PENSION LAW, supranote 4, at 68-71. After the closing, the plant's 11,000
employees were split into three groups. Id at 69. Group one, consisting of 3,600 retirement-aged
employees, received their pension benefits in full. Id. Group two, consisting of 4,000 employees
between the ages of forty and fifty-nine with ten or more years of service at the plant, received
approximately fifteen percent of their pension benefits. Id. Group three, a residual group
consisting of 2,900 employees, "received nothing." Id. Soon after this, tragic stories of employees
who lost their pension benefits emerged. See, e.g., id at 70-71 (describing Senate hearings in
which a fifty-nine year old man testified that, after thirty-eight years of working for Studebaker,
he was laid off, losing the pension benefits he had planned to rely on to retire).
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B. The Enactment of ERISA-The Retirement Security Solution
The Studebaker plant closing"° epitomized the problem of employees
losing the pension benefits that they were relying on to retire. 5 Prior to the
plant closing, government officials and private pension experts spent several
years discussing this problem;52 however, the plant closing provided the
calamity necessary to propel pension reform to the forefront of the national
policy debate.13 Indeed, two years after the plant closing, a cabinet-level
committee's report, reaffirming the strong public interest in private pension
programs, found that Congress needed to make employee pension plans
more reliable.54 Yet, even with Studebaker as the "poster child" for pension
reform, more than a decade of persistent policy advocacy passed before
Congress finally enacted ERISA."5
Congress enacted ERISA for the purpose of protecting employee
retirement benefits. 6 To achieve this end, ERISA contains fiduciary rules
governing plan administration and investment.5 7 Moreover, ERISA
established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to guard an
employee's retirement assets against an insolvent employer.58 Thus, ERISA

50. See supranote 49 and accompanying text. The Studebaker plant closing received intense
media coverage. See Allen, supra note 49, at 71. This is probably because of Studebaker's
standing as the oldest automobile manufacturer in the nation, coupled with the fact that a few days
before Christmas thousands of employees, many losing their pension benefits, were laid off. Id.
51. See id. at 70.
52. James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business": The
Studebaker-PackardCorporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683,732 (2001).
53. See id. at 735-38.
54. Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?,in PENSION LAW, supra note
4, at 76-77. President Kennedy established the committee on March 28, 1962. Id. at 75. It was
known as the Committee on Corporate Pension Funds and other Private Retirement and Welfare
Programs. Id.
55. Wooten, supra note 52, at 739. On September 2, 1974, President Gerald Ford's
signature enacted ERISA. Id.
56. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86,96 n.5
(1993); see also Bellas v. CBS, Inc., 221 F.3d 517, 522 (3d Cir. 2000) ("The protection of
retirement benefits reflects the underlying policy goals of ERISA.").
57. See PENSION LAW, supranote 4, at 122. Further, to protect retirement benefits, ERISA
contains antiforfeiture rules, called vesting rules, that regulate the extent to which the forfeiture
of pension benefits may occur. Id. at 121-22. Additionally, Congress supplied ERISA with
reporting and disclosure requirements to make ERISA's substantive provisions enforceable. Id
at 122.
58. See id. at 900. For an individual retiring at the age of sixty-five, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) provides insurance for vested accrued retirement benefits up to
$35,000 per year. Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinkingthe Risk ofDefined ContributionPlans,4 FLA.
TAX REV. 607, 611 (2000). Generally, few pension plan participants have benefits exceeding this
amount. Id.
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protects employees against threats to their retirement benefits including
fiduciary breaches, poor investments, and employer insolvency."
ERISA's protections, however, reflect the assumption that employersponsored retirement plans take the form of defined benefit plans, the
predominant type of retirement plan in place at the time Congress passed
ERISA.6" Simply stated, defined benefit plans pool plan assets in an
aggregate trust fund and promise employees a specified amount upon
retirement. 6 ' With a defined benefit plan, the sponsoring employer bears the
risk that the plan will attain the promised value.62 Furthermore, insurance
from the PBGC protects employees against employer insolvency.63
In contrast, defined contribution plans assign employees to an individual
account.? An employee receives the entire account balance at retirement
and usually determines, within limits,65 the amount contributed to the
account.66 The success of a defined contribution plan largely depends on the
investment decisions of the employee.67 Since the account balance at
retirement, instead of a predetermined amount, determines an employee's
total retirement benefit, the employee, rather than the employer or the
PBGC, bears the risk of accumulating insufficient retirement savings.68
Beyond assuming this risk, the employee in a defined contribution plan
faces a further disadvantage in that ERISA affords retirement benefits in a
defined contribution plan less protection than retirement benefits in a
defined benefit plan. 69 This is because when Congress enacted ERISA,
defined contribution plans were uncommon and were used primarily to
supplement defined benefit plans.70 The emerging trend, however, has been
for employers to offer defined contribution plans as primary retirement

59. See Jefferson, supra note 58, at 611-12. Inadequate funding is another threat to an

employee's retirement benefits against which ERISA protects. Id at 612.
60. See id. at613.
61. Id. at610.
62. James Epstein, Note, ProtectingPensionAnnuities When InsuranceCompanies Fail:
The ERISA FiduciaryStandards,44 FLA. L. REV. 107, 107 n.l (1992).
63. Jefferson, supra note 58, at 611-12.
64. Jefferson, supra note 58.
65. See generallyBruce Wolk, The New Excise andEstateTaxes on ExcessRetirementPlan
Distributionsand Accumulations, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 987, 989 (1987) (explaining that ERISA
places limits on the amount of contributions allowed to retirement plans to prevent tax benefits
from being used to subsidize excessively large retirement benefits).
66. Epstein, supra note 62, at 107 n.l.
67. Jefferson, supranote 58, at 628.
68. Id. at 611-12.
69. See id. at 614.
70. Id. at 613.
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plans.71 Specifically, the popularity ofone type ofdefined contribution plan,
the 401(k) plan, has skyrocketed.2
C. The Emergence of 401 (I) Plans-An UnanticipatedThreat to
Retirement Security
Four years after Congress enacted ERISA, the Revenue Act of 197871
added section 401(k) to the Internal Revenue Code (LRC), thus creating
what is now known as the 40 1(k) plan.74 At the outset, Congress intended
that 401 (k) plans, similar to other defined contribution plans, would be used
mainly for the purpose of supplemental retirement savings.'
As an incentive to save, a401(k) plan allows an employee atax deferral
on a voluntarily elected portion of salary placed in an individual retirement
account by an employer on behalf of the employee.76 Typically, the
employer matches a percentage of the employee's contributions to the
401(k) plan.77 The match rate is commonly fifty percent up to a cap, such
as five percent of the employee's total compensation for a given year. 8
Structurally, 401(k) plans generally consist ofarange of stock and bond

portfolios from which an employee may choose to invest.79 In addition,

401(k) plans frequently offer employer stock."0 The employee makes
investment decisions between the available alternatives to determine how
plan contributions to the employee's account are allocated." Thus, 401(k)
plans are usually employee-directed and act like tax-deferred brokerage
accounts. Importantly, as in the case ofbrokerage accounts and other forms

71. Id.
72. Medill, supranote 12, at 6.
73. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 401(k) (2002)).
74. PENSION LAW, supranote 4, at 51. The Revenue Act of 1978 took effect in 1980, six
years after Congress enacted ERISA, making 401(k) plans available to the public. Medill, supra
note 12, at 7. The roots of 401(k) plans can be traced back to 1972, "when the Treasury
[Department] and [Internal Revenue] Service issued proposed income tax regulations concerning
contributions to qualified retirement plans under salary reduction agreements." Richard F. Yates,
Social Security Tax Treatment of Cafeteria Plans, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 615, 622 (1985). This
proposed legislation "set into motion a series of events that eventually" resulted in the creation
of 401(k) plans. Id.
75. See supra text accompanying note 70.
76. See PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 51. The income tax on a 401(k) plan contribution is
deferred "until the time of withdrawal." Idl
77. Id. at 50.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 51. Usually, these portfolios are provided by "one or more of the mutual fund
companies, banks, and insurance companies." Id.
80. Susan J.Stabile, PensionPlanInvestments in Employer Securities:More Is NotAlways
Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 66 (1998).
81. See Medill, supra note 12, at 11-12.
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of defined contribution plans, retirement assets in 401(k) plans are not
guaranteed by the employer to be at any particular level at the time an
employee retires.8 2
In the decades since their inception, 401(k) plans have grown
increasingly popular. Census bureau data indicates that in 1983, three
percent of full-time private wage and salary workers participated in 401 (k)
plans.8 3 Within ten years, that figure rose to forty-seven percent.8
Moreover, in 1999, a study of 491 companies showed that forty-one
percent of 401 (k) plans were relied on by employees as a primary source of
retirement income. 5 While 401(k) plans have become increasingly popular,
the popularity of defined benefit plans appears to be waning. 6
This shift is attributable to the preference employers and employees
share for 401(k) plans." Employers favor 401(k) plans because they are
subject to fewer costs, administrative burdens, and cumbersome regulations
than defined benefit plans.88 Employees favor 401(k) plans because of the
flexibility and employee involvement often associated with them. 9 Despite
their popularity, 401 (k)plans threaten the national interest in preserving the
institution of retirement by providing inadequate security to employee
retirement assets.
ERISA, for example, expressly limits the PBGC to apply to defined
benefit plans, thereby leaving retirement benefits in defined contribution
plans, such as 401(k) plans, uninsured.90 Moreover, while ERISA's
fiduciary rules provide strong protection to defined benefit plans, these
rules provide little protection to 401(k) and other defined contribution
plans.9 Thus, 401 (k) plans thwart the Congressional intent to use ERISA's
strict fiduciary rules to protect employee retirement assets.

82.
83.
84.
85.
469, 478
86.

See Epstein, supra note 62, at 107 n.1.
PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 51.
Id.
Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans,34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORm
(2001). This figure is up from thirty-five percent in 1995. Id.
See John R. Keville, Note, Retire at Your Own Risk: ERISA 'sReturn on Investment?,

68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 527, 534-35 (1994).
87. See Jefferson, supra note 58, at 614-15.

88. Id.
89. Id at 615. For instance, 401(k) plans often have more liberal vesting schedules than
traditional pension plans. Ido Some 401(k) plans, under certain circumstances, allow for account
distributions prior to retirement. See id. Additionally, most 401(k) plans grant participants
investment control over plan assets. Id.
90. See PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 899.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 110-41.
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III. THE STATUS QUO
A. How ERISA 's FiduciaryRules Protect
1. The ERISA Fiduciary Label
Congress designed ERISA "to remedy improprieties with respect to a
benefits plan committed by" a fiduciary.92 Accordingly, the significance of
the fiduciary label cannot be understated. Without first identifying an
individual as a fiduciary, little likelihood exists for bringing a successful
ERISA action against that individual.9 3
For ERISA purposes, a fiduciary is anyone with discretionary authority
or control over the management of a plan, the administration of a plan, or
the disposition of a plan's assets.94 Under this definition, fiduciary duties
generally attach to plan administrators.9" However, a plan may have more
than one fiduciary.9 6 Furthermore, no formal title is necessary to invoke
fiduciary status.9 7 Since, in the case of a fiduciary breach, liability only
attaches to a fiduciary, designation as a fiduciary carries significant legal
consequences. Therefore, employers commonly avoid fiduciary liability by
not engaging in any activity, such as plan administration, that invokes
fiduciary status.
Moreover, an employer invoking fiduciary status, by serving as a plan
administrator, for example, still escapes fiduciary liability if, during the
alleged breach, the employer acted as a plan settlor instead of as a plan
fiduciary.98 An employer functions as a plan settlor when the employer acts
in a business capacity such as by adopting, implementing, amending, or
terminating a plan.99 Conversely, an employer serving in a business capacity

92. Munoz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 633 F. Supp. 564, 570 (D. Colo. 1986).
93. PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 653.
94. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 3(21); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)
(2000). Generally, attorneys, actuaries, accountants, and consultants are not considered fiduciaries
under ERISA. Frank P. VanderPloeg, Role-PlayingUnder ERISA: The Company as "Employer"
and "Fiduciary,"9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 259,299-300 (1997). Moreover, an individual performing
"purely 'ministerial' functions for a benefit plan is not a fiduciary. Such ministerial functions
include the application of rules determining eligibility for participation, calculation of services and
benefits, and collection of contributions." Blatt v. Marshall & Lassman, 812 F.2d 810, 812 (2d
Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
95. VanderPloeg, supra note 94, at 264.
96. See Blatt, 812 F.2d at 812.
97. Id.
98. VanderPloeg, supra note 94, at 272-75.
99. Id, at 273-75. This is "provided that the benefits reduced or eliminated are not accrued
or vested at the time, and that the [employer's action] does not otherwise violate ERISA or the
express terms of the plan." Id. at 276.
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may invoke fiduciary liability by functioning as a plan fiduciary, such as by
exercising control over plan administration.'00 Thus, a determination of
whether an employer acted in a business or fiduciary capacity, at the time
of an alleged fiduciary breach, is necessary before fiduciary liability will
attach to that employer.' °
In Varity Corp. v. Howe, 10 2 for example, the Supreme Court found that
an employer triggered fiduciary liability by intentionally communicating to
employees false information about the future security of their plan
benefits. 03
' In that case, an employer attempted to encourage its employees
to transfer their jobs to a subsidiary employer by intentionally
misrepresenting information about the future security of their benefits.' 4
The Court rejected the argument that the employer acted in a business
capacity when it made the intentional misrepresentations to its
employees.'0 5 In rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that the
employer functioned in a fiduciary capacity because the employer, by
communicating information concerning plan benefits to its employees, acted
as a plan administrator, impacting its employees' decisions about plan
participation. 6
Although, the employer in Varity also served as the plan's
administrator,0 7 fiduciary liability will likely attach to any employer that
intentionally misrepresents information to employees regarding their
benefits.' Thus, when an employer intentionally misrepresents information
to employees concerning their benefits, the employer may not avoid
fiduciary liability by claiming to have acted in a business capacity or as a
plan settlor.'0 9

100. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 498-503 (1996).
101. See, e.g., id.
102. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
103. Id. at 503-05.
104. Id. at 493-94. The employer also made misrepresentations to the employees about the
subsidiary's future business prospects and financial viability. Id. The Court found that the
employer's actions were motivated by a desire to eliminate benefit plan costs. Id. at 493.
105. Id at 505.
106. Id at 502-03. Moreover, the Court reasoned that a reasonable employee under the
circumstances could have thought that the employer was communicating both as an employer and
as a plan administrator. Id at 503.
107. As noted by VanderPloeg, the Varity court emphasized the fact that the employer also
served as the plan administrator. VanderPloeg, supra note 94, at 298. Although this fact
undoubtedly strengthened the employee's argumentthat the employer acted in a fiduciary capacity
when making intentional misrepresentations to employees about their future benefits, this fact
should not be determinative on the issue. Id at 298-303.
108. Id. at303.
109. See id.
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2. ERISA's Fiduciary Rules
A plan fiduciary has several duties to employees who are plan
participants. "' First, pursuant to section 404(a) ofERISA, a fiduciary must
act for the exclusive benefit of plan participants and for the sole purpose of
"providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries" and defraying
expenses associated with plan administration."' Of course, however, an
employer that avoids qualification as an ERISA fiduciary may make plan
decisions serving its own interests.
Second, section 404(a) requires that a fiduciary act with the "care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."'

2

This duty of care includes an employer's duty to prudently "select and
monitor the activities of both co-fiduciaries to the plan, including any
investment advisors, and non-fiduciary service providers.""' 3
Finally, under section 404(a), a fiduciary must prudently diversify the
investments in a plan to minimize the risk of an employee sustaining large
losses. "' Generally, prudent diversification entails using modem portfolio
theory, a theory telling investors how to combine investments in their
portfolios to provide the return on investment they seek with the least
possible risk,' " to guide investment decisions." 6 Thus, a fiduciary generally
has a duty to use modem portfolio theory to diversify a plan's investments
to minimize risk and maximize the probability of financial success." 7
In addition to fiduciary liability, an employer is also subject, pursuant to
section 405 of ERISA, to co-fiduciary liability."' Under certain

110. This Note concentrates on the fiduciary duties found in sections 404(a) and 405 of
ERISA. However, section 406 of ERISA also imposes significant duties on an ERISA fiduciary.
Id. at 265. Specifically, section 406 of ERISA "bars a fiduciary from causing a plan to engage in
what he knows, or should know, is a prohibited transaction with a party in interest, or a selfdealing, conflict, or kickback transaction." Id. The role, in Enron's collapse, of actions governed
by section 406 would make an interesting topic for future research.

Ill. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2000).
112. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
113. Medill, supra note 12, at 31.
114. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C). Additionally, a fiduciary must act
"in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents
and instruments are consistent with" ERISA's fiduciary responsibility and plan termination
insurance provisions. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
115. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOwN WALL STREET 235 (6th ed. 1996).

116.
117.
317 (5th
theory).
118.

See Jefferson, supranote 58, at 628.
See Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d 313,
Cir. 1999) (finding that ERISA requires that a fiduciary abide by modem portfolio
ERISA § 405(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a).
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circumstances, co-fiduciary liability makes one fiduciary liable for another
fiduciary's breach of a fiduciary duty." 9 For instance, an employer, who
breaches its fiduciary duty of care by failing to monitor a fiduciary plan
investment advisor may assume liability for any subsequent fiduciary breach
by that investment advisor. 20
3. The Relationship Between ERISA's Fiduciary Rules and 401(k) Plans
Although ERISA contains stringent fiduciary rules, these rules often do
not apply to 401 (k)plans. For instance, in the case ofa defined benefit plan,
the amount invested in employer stock cannot exceed ten percent of the
plan's total assets.' This requirement helps protect plan participants from
concerns about self-dealing and diversification of plan assets.' This
requirement does not apply, however, to 401(k) and other defined
contribution plans." In fact, plan permitting, employees may invest up to
one hundred percent of their 401 (k) assets in employer stock. 2 4Moreover,
section 404(c) of ERISA exempts employers from much of their duties of
care and prudence as well as from co-fiduciary liability when investment
decisions are employee directed, provided the section's safe harbor
provisions are met."
Specifically, section 404(c) provides that in the case of a pension plan
consisting of individual employee accounts, where a plan participant
exercises control over an account's assets, no fiduciary shall be liable "for
any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such participant's
or beneficiary's exercise of control."' 26 Additionally, pursuant to section
404(c), the plan participant exercising control may not be deemed a plan
119. ERISA section 405(a) states in relevant part that:
[A] fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable for a breach of fiduciary
responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the same plan in the following

circumstances: (1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to
conceal, an act or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission
is a breach; (2) if, by his failure to comply with section 1 104(a)(1) of this title in
the administration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as
a fiduciary, he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a breach; or (3) if he
has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable
efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach.

ERISA § 405(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See Medill, supra note 12, at 32.
Stabile, supranote 80, at 80.
Id. at 67.
See id at 67-68.
See id.at 68.
See Medill, supra note 12, at 33.
ERISA § 404(c)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(13).
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fiduciary. 27 Thus, compliance with section 404(c) absolves employers from
fiduciary and co-fiduciary liability for the investment decisions of
employees. 128
To garner the protection of section 404(c) the employer must comply
with the section's statutory requirements and Department of Labor (DOL)
regulations.'29 The DOL regulations provide that before a participant is
found to have independent control over plan assets, the plan must meet
several conditions.
First, a broad range of investment alternatives must be available to the
participant. 30 An employer, however, may satisfy this requirement by
offering employees with 401 (k) plans only three investment alternatives. "'
Although employer stock cannot be counted as one of these alternatives,
employers may add employer stock as an additional alternative. 3 2 Second,
the participant should have the opportunity to give investment instructions
with an appropriate frequency considering the market volatility ofthe plan's
investment alternatives.' Third, the participant must be able to minimize
the risk of large losses by diversifying within and among the investment

alternatives. 34 Lastly, the participant must receive sufficient information to
make informed investment decisions.'35 Significantly, however, this

condition does not require employers to provide employees with investment

127. ERISA § 404(c)(1)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A),
128. See Medill, supra note 12, at 34.
129. Keith R. Pyle, Note, Compliance Under ERISA Section 404(c) with Increasing
Investment Alternatives andAccount Accessibility, 32 IND. L. REv. 1467, 1469-70 (1999).
130. Medill, supra note 12, at 34.
131. Pyle, supra note 129, at 1472. The investment alternatives must have the following
characteristics:
(1) each alternative must be diversified; (2) each alternative must have materially
different risk and return characteristics; (3) the alternatives must, when taken
together, allow the participant or beneficiary to achieve a portfolio with risk and
return characteristics at any point within a range that would be considered
appropriate for the participant or beneficiary; and (4) each alternative, when
combined with investments from the other alternatives, must tend to minimize
through diversification the overall risk to the participant's or beneficiary's
portfolio.
Id.
132. Medill, supranote 85, at 524. Plans offering employer stock as an additional investment
alternative are subject to special rules that are designed to ensure that investment decisions are
made by the employee without undue influence from the employer. Id.
133. Medill, supra note 12, at 34-35.
134. Id. at35.
135. Id.; see also Medill, supra note 85, at 525-26 (describing the information that plan
participants are required to receive).
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education or advice.136 Moreover, substantial evidence shows that employer
communications with137employees are ineffective in aiding employee
investment decisions.
Since employers have great incentive to meet the statutory and
regulatory requirements of section 404(c), this section tends to reach
401 (k) plans with relative ease.131 Once the requirements of section 404(c)
are met, "plan fiduciaries will not be liable for any losses that are the direct
result of the participants' exercise of control.' 39 Thus, employees with
401 (k)plans usually are not protected by certain fiduciary obligations such
as the fiduciary obligation to prudently diversify plan assets. 41 Should an
employee, despite section 404(c), establish the occurrence of a fiduciary
breach, recovery of damages is unlikely.
4. Recovering Damages-Reaching for a Well's Bottom
An employee, having lost retirement savings from a 401(k) plan,
fortunate enough to establish a fiduciary breach, is like a certain traveler,
lost in the desert, searching for water. After surviving several obstacles
before finding a well, the traveler sees, collected at the well's bottom, only
a puddle of water. Unfortunately, the lost traveler cannot reach it. Like the
lost traveler unable to reach the water, the employee is unlikely to ever
reach a fiduciary's pockets to recover damages. This is because courts have
tended to contradict ERISA's stated purpose of protecting the retirement
assests of employees by establishing fiduciary standards and providing
remedies for breaches of those standards.' 4 '
Section 502 of ERISA provides that a civil action may be brought by a
plan participant "to obtain... appropriate equitable relief."' 142 In Mertens
v. Hewitt Associates,4 3 the Supreme Court shut the door on a participant
attempting to collect compensatory damages beyond equitable relief.'"

136. See Medill, supra note 85, at 526. One explanation for this is that employers, out of
liability concerns, tend to provide investment information that is too vague to be useful. See
Jefferson, supra note 58, at 630-32.
137. See Jefferson, supra note 58, at 638 (explaining that communications are often
ineffective because employees either do not understand or disregard them).
138. See Medill, supra note 12, at 34.
UnderSection
139. Nell Hennessy &Frank Daniele, Participant-DirectedRetirementPlans
404(c), in ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW 176 (Susan P. Serota ed., 1995).
140. See Medill, supra note 12, at 33.
141. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 513 (1996) (explaining ERISA's basic
purpose).
142. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2000).
143. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
144. See id. at 257-58. This case is generally cited for the proposition that an employee
attempting to recover damages as a result of a fiduciary breach is limited to seeking "appropriate
equitable relief." Id; see also, e.g., Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944 (8th
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Thus, even in the face of appalling fiduciary behavior,145courts have not been
willing to grant anything other than equitable relief.
Furthermore, courts have generally interpreted "appropriate equitable
relief' in such a restrictive fashion as to preclude the recovery of restitution
except under exceptional circumstances. 46 Accordingly, an employee, after
establishing a fiduciary breach, usually cannot recover a monetary award as
compensation for lost retirement assets.
Significantly, aside from recovering damages from a fiduciary in a civil
suit, an employee with a defined benefit plan may recover lost retirement
assets from the employer or the PBGC, whereas an employee with a 401 (k)
plan does not have these options.147 Thus, by drastically limiting an
employee's ability to recover monetary damages against a fiduciary in a
civil suit, Mertens particularly devastated the security of retirement assets
in 401(k) plans. 48 Absent security from ERISA, the retirement of many
employees with 401(k) plans rests on the false assumption that making
sound investment decisions with a 401(k) plan ensures that an employee
will achieve sufficient retirement savings.
B. Determinants of 401 (k) PlanSuccess or Failure
As primary retirement plans, 401 (k) plans shift investment responsibility
from employers to employees.1 49 In the case of a defined benefit plan,
responsibility over plan investment decisions resides with the employer, its
financial officers, and its expert advisors.' Conversely, in the case of a
401 (k) plan, responsibility over plan investment decisions resides with the
individual employee.'' This shift in responsibility continues to serve, inthe
case of 401(k) plans, as a justification for the loosening of ERISA's

Cir. 1999). Interestingly, however, Mertens involved employees attempting to recover damages
against a nonfiduciary. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251.
145. See, e.g., Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651,656-61 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that former
employees were entitled to nothing more than equitable relief where a fiduciary repeatedly
responded with excessive hostility and resistance to their requests for distributions from their
profit sharing plans).
146. See, e.g., id.at 656 (defining "equitable" as "injunctive or declaratory relief"); Kerr, 184
F.3d at 944 (noting that for a plaintiff to recover restitution, the defendant must have received "ill
gotten gains").
147. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
148. See Jefferson, supra note 58, at 626 (explaining that the Supreme Court's holding in
Mertens, that "nonfiduciary service providers are immune from fiduciary liability," may cause
more harm to employees with defined contribution plans than to employees with defined benefit
plans because employees with defined contribution plans are not protected by employer liability
and the PBGC).
149. PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 53.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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fiduciary rules and the shift in liability over
retirement assets from the
52
employer and the PBGC to the employee.
With full responsibility for achieving a satisfactory retirement benefit
residing with the employee, a 401(k) plan's success turns on several
interrelated factors. The first is decisions made by an employee regarding
plan contributions and investments." 3 Because, in the case ofa401 (k) plan,
an employee decides the extent to which contributions are made to the
plan, 154 an employee bears the risk of not contributing enough money to
accumulate a satisfactory amount of retirement assets.' This risk is
heightened by the fact that "[m]any Americans have
a false sense of
'15 6
retirement.'
own
their
concem[ing]
confidence...
Moreover, while fiduciaries are obligated to use modem portfolio theory
57
when making retirement investment decisions, employees are not.
Although use of modem portfolio theory is advisable to reduce risk and to
achieve a satisfactory retirement benefit, employees with 401 (k) plans tend
to risk accumulating insufficient assets for retirement by following
unconventional approaches to 401(k) plan investing.' This result is not
surprising given the complexity of modem portfolio theory and the general
nature or absence of investment education materials provided to
employees.5 9
A related factor that tends to impact the success of a 401(k) plan is the
extent to which a 401(k) plan is invested in employer stock."' Generally,
investment advisors agree that an investment portfolio should contain no
more than five to fifteen percent of any single stock.' Yet, on average,
employees in defined contribution plans invest thirty-three percent oftheir
plan assets in employer stock when it is offered as an investment
alternative. 62 This phenomenon is explained by employees being influenced
by employers and
underestimating the risks associated with investing in
6
employer stock. 1

152. See Jefferson, supra note 58, at 616.
153. See Medill, supra note 12, at 11.
154. See PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 50.
155. Medill, supra note 12, at 70.
156. Id at 14.

157. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
158. See Medill, supra note 12, at 26.

159. Id. Fear of invoking fiduciary liability prevents employers from providing employees
with anything more than general investment education materials. See id.
160. PENSION LAW, supra note 4, at 53.
161. Stabile, supra note 80, at 81-82.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 82-83. Employer influence may be informal, such as employers "letting it be
known that they look kindly upon employees' investing in employer [stock]," or it may be formal,
such as employers "making 401 (k) matching contributions solely in the form of employer [stock]."

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REPVIEW

[Vol. 54

Overinvestment of 401 (k) plan assets in employer stock may jeopardize
an employee's ability to retire in several ways. For example, employees that
overinvest their 401 (k) plans in employer stock are not insulated against the
loss in value of that investment.164 Of course, a retirement plan's underdiversification poses problems whether the source of the underdiversification is employer stock or not. 16 However, employees overly
invested in employer stock face problems larger than those associated with
under-diversification. For instance, an employer's misfortunes could lead
to an employee losing both a job and retirement assets. 166 Thus, by
overinvesting 401 (k) plan assets in employer stock, an employee adversely
impacts the security of retirement assets.
While an employee may control investment decisions, including the
extent to which a plan is invested in employer stock, the success of a 401 (k)
plan depends in part on factors outside of an employee's control, such as
the stock market and economic conditions during an employee's
employment. 167 For example, although use of modem portfolio theory
protects an employee against the risk of market fluctuations over the course
of a career, use of modem portfolio theory only minimizes investment
losses during stock market declines. 61 Therefore, an employee, properly
using modem portfolio theory to invest 401(k) plan assets, may still
accumulate an insufficient amount of assets for retirement if a large part of
an employee's69 career coincides with a period of unsatisfactory market
performance.
Similarly, another factor outside of an employee's control that
determines the success of a 401(k) plan is the market and economic
conditions at the time funds from a 401(k) plan are distributed. 7 Because
the value of a 401(k) plan largely depends on the prevailing market and
economic conditions,17 ' unfavorable market and economic conditions
around the time retirement funds are needed may negate the results reaped
from following a disciplined 401(k) investment strategy.

Id. at 82. Another explanation for employee overinvestment in employer stock is the sense of
loyalty some employees feel toward their employers. Id. at 82-83.
164. See id. at 78-79.
165. Seeid.
166. Id. at 79.
167. See Stephen F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The Sounds ofSilence: The Libertarian
Ethos ofERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REv. 1, 8 n.32 (2000).
168. See MALKIEL,'supra note 115, at 239 (stating that "when the market gets clobbered just
about all stocks go down").
169. See generally id. at 372-73 (explaining that between 1968 and 1979, U.S. common
stocks returned an average annual rate of only 3.1 percent and created a "nouveau poor in the
United States").
170. See Befort & Kopka, supra note 167, at 8 n.32.
171. See Medill, supranote 85, at 470.
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For example, in October 1987, when the value of stocks fell by onethird,"7 equity-based 401(k) plans, notwithstanding modem portfolio
theory, inevitably lost approximately one-third oftheir value. This dramatic
drop in the value of 401(k) plans surely altered the ability of many
employees to retire as planned. Accordingly, a 401 (k) plan's success, to an
extent, depends on the state of the market at the time an employee's
retirement funds are distributed.
C. The Impact of 401 (k) Plans on FederalRetirement Policy
ERISA has not yet adapted to the modem reality that employersponsored retirement plans are now predominantly 401(k) plans. As a
result, history repeats itself as, again, employees are not able to rely on their
employer-sponsored retirement plans to meet their retirement income
needs. Therefore, many employees will be unable to retire due to an
insufficient accumulation of retirement assets or the uncertain effect the
stock market will have on their retirement savings.
Moreover, employers, without their employees having an expectation
of retirement, will no longer be able to rely on retirement as a tool to
manage the orderly exit of their employees from the workforce. Likewise,
as people stay healthier and live longer, young workers may have trouble
entering the workforce as few jobs become open to them. Thus, without
judicial and legislative change, the continued proliferation of 401 (k) plans
as primary retirement savings vehicles will negatively impact the institution
of retirement and the strong national interest in preserving it.
IV. LEARNING FROM ENRON:

A MODEL FOR CHANGE

Much like the 1963 Studebaker plant closing, 73 the Enron debacle
exposed flaws in the private pension system that threaten the national
interest in preserving the institution of retirement. Specifically, Enron
highlighted that the law, at present, provides inadequate security to
retirement assets in 401(k) plans.
At Enron, company officials permitted employees to overinvest their
401(k) plans in employer stock. 74 Beyond merely permitting this
unorthodox approach to retirement investing, company officials, through
formal policy and informal advice, encouraged employees to engage in it.'75

172.

MALKIEL, supra note 115, at 195.
173. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Schultz, supranote 5, at C1.
175. See Daniel Altman, Experts Say Diversify, But Many PlansRely Heavily on Company
Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at 26; Albert B. Crenshaw, Retirees, Workers Assail Enron on
401(k) Freeze, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at E12 (hereinafter 401(k) Freeze); Sue Kirchoff,
Pension Panic: Enron Debacle Pushes Congress Toward Tightening 401(k) Rules, BOSTON
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Moreover, as Enron's stock began to slide, company officials initiated a
"lock down" of 401(k) plans that prevented employees from selling the illfated stock before it was too late.176 As a result of these practices, hundreds
of Enron employees lost most of their retirement assets. 7 In the end,7 these
employees were left only with questionable claims against Enron. 1
This tragedy, like the Studebaker plant closing, garnered the media
attention necessary to push the cause of retirement security to center stage
of the national policy debate.' 9 While the Enron debacle seems to have
produced the assumption that 401(k) plan reform is necessary,
disagreement exists over the extent of pension reform that is appropriate.8 0
Nonetheless, due to the strong national interest of protecting retirement,''
any attempt at 401(k) plan reform should focus on achieving retirement
security for working people.' Further, courtroom advocacy should work
in conjunction with legislative action to accomplish this objective.
A. CourtroomAdvocacy for Retirement Security
1. The ERISA Fiduciary Label Revisited
Although the large losses in retirement assets suffered by Enron
employees resulted largely from Enron's actions,' 83 employees will have a
difficult time recouping their losses unless the fiduciary label attaches to

GLOBE, Jan. 18, 2002, at Cl. Beyond providing employees informal encouragement, Enron
officials motivated employees to invest their retirement assets in Enron stock through a companywide 401(k) plan policy. See Crenshaw, supra note 5, at HO. The 401(k) plan policy at Enron
provided a match in Enron stock to those employees that made contributions to their 401(k) plan.
Id. Further, employees could not move the matched shares of Enron stock into other investments
until the they turned age fifty. See id.
176. Ellen E. Schultz, 'Lockdowns' of 4Ol(k) PlansDraw Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16,
2002, at Cl.
177. See Leigh Strope, Congress Attempts to PreventAnother Enron, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Mar. 22, 2002, at BI.
178. See Albert B. Crenshaw, BadAdvice, but Actionable?, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2002, at
El0.
179. See generally, Strope, supra note 177, at BI (summarizing the issues involved in the
Congressional debate over 40 1(k) plan reform that resulted from the Enron debacle).
180. See id.
181. See Albert B. Crenshaw, 401(k) Debate: The Jackpotvs. the Sure Thing, WASH. POST,
Mar. 24, 2002, at H04 (quoting Senator Edward M. Kennedy as saying, "I don't think there is a
more important priority for Congress than the retirement security of American workers").
182. But cf id. (finding that some members of Congress want pension reform to focus on an
employee's ability to attain wealth, rather than an employee's retirement security).
183. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
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Enron.' 84 Thus, the question of whether Enron invoked ERISA fiduciary
status is a pivotal one.
Under Varity, an employer invokes ERISA fiduciary status by
intentionally communicating false information to employees concerning
their benefits.' 85 While Enron encouraged employees to invest their 401 (k)
plans imprudently, employees may have difficulty proving that Enron's
communications with them constituted intentional misrepresentations of
benefits information.8 6 However, courts should extend Varity to attach
ERISA's fiduciary label to employers that encourage employees to follow
an imprudent 401(k) plan investment strategy."8 7
Varify essentially found that an employer that functions as a de facto
plan administrator and misrepresents information about a benefit plan's
security should be held liable as an ERISA fiduciary. 8 Varity, however,
involved a welfare benefit plan and not a 401(k) plan.8 9 A 401(k) plan is
different from a welfare benefit plan or a defined benefit plan because plan
assets are not held together in a trust, but are held in separate accounts for
each plan participant. 9
In the case of a 401(k) plan, an employer, by encouraging an employee
to engage in a particular investment strategy, directly exercises
discretionary control over the way a 401(k) plan is managed. This is
because employees tend to change the investment allocation oftheir 401 (k)
plans based on their employers' suggestions. 9 ' Thus, an employer's
encouragement directly impacts the composition of a 401 (k) plan.
In this sense, by providing unconventional investment advice, an
employer commandeers an employee's 401(k) plan. By contrast, in a
situation involving a welfare benefit plan, as in Varity, the link between an
employer's non-fraudulent communications with employees and an
employer's discretionary control over plan management is much more

184. See supranotes 92-93 and accompanying text.
185. Supra note 108 and accompanying text.
186. See Crenshaw, supra note 178, at ElO.
187. Importantly, the proposed rule involves a determination of the acceptability of the
investment approach encouraged by the employer and not a hindsight determination of an
employee's investment success. See Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative
Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999).
188. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
189. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 491-92 (1996).

190. See supra note 61-66 and accompanying text.
191. See Medill, supra note 12, at 25 (finding that "employees consistently indicate that they
respond to investment allocation educational materials by changing their plan investment
allocation mix"). Moreover, informal and formal encouragement from employers clearly impacts
the investment decisions of employees. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 175, at 26; 401(k) Freeze,
supranote 175, at El2.
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tenuous. 2 Thus, in the case of a 401(k) plan, the fiduciary label should
attach to an employer each time the employer communicates with
employees about their 401(k) plans.
Arguments may be advanced that an approach such as this one will
discourage needed 401(k) plan education. This argument, however, does
not hold weight. The "education" Enron provided to its employees
jeopardized its employees' retirement security while benefitting Enron.'93
In fact, little or nothing can be gained by allowing employers to provide
employees with retirement investment advice that is generally regarded as
dangerous.
Accordingly, this rule would encourage employers to take steps to
ensure that they do not carelessly threaten an employee's retirement
security or provide employees with investment advice that serves the
company rather than the employee. Clearly, under the proposed rule, the
fiduciary label would attach to Enron and provide Enron employees with
grounds upon which to seek relief. Even with this rule, however, relief for
Enron employees still may not be forthcoming because current law would
likely preclude them from recouping their losses.
2. The Well's Bottom Revisited
Should Enron employees try to recover their lost retirement assets,
ERISA, as it has been interpreted through Mertens and subsequent federal
court cases, would likely block them from recovering their losses. This is
because courts have tended to construe ERISA section 502, "Civil
Enforcement," to mean that an employee may not recover a monetary
award for losses that result from a fiduciary breach. 94 To arrive at this
interpretation, courts have ignored ERISA' s general purpose and narrowed
the meaning of equitable relief beyond recognition.
Indeed, interpreting ERISA section 502 to prevent employees from
recovering retirement assets, lost as a result of fiduciary breaches, seems
contrary to ERISA's primary purpose of protecting employee retirement
benefits through the imposition oftough fiduciary standards. 95 In enforcing
ERISA's fiduciary standards, section 502 provides employees with the
power to enjoin a fiduciary from engaging in a practice that violates ERISA

192. Thus, in Varity, the employer needed to intentionally misrepresent false information to
employees concerning their benefits to function as a fiduciary by acting in the capacity of a plan
administrator. Varity, 516 U.S. at 502-04.
193. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., The Dangerin a One-Basket Nest Egg Prompts a Call
to Limit Stock, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 2001, at C I (stating that "[c]ompanies favor using their own
stock in 401(k) plans in part because of the tax breaks").
194. See supra notes 141-45.
195. Jefferson, supra note 58, at 620.
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and the power to seek "other appropriate equitable relief"'96 If "other
appropriate equitable relief' should be interpreted, as courts have
suggested, to essentially include only injunctions and other like remedies,
then this provision would appear to be redundant. In light of ERISA's
purpose, however, Congress likely intended that, pursuant to section 502,
employees could recoup losses sustained as a result of a fiduciary breach
and deter fiduciaries from engaging in activities that would threaten the
security of their retirement.
Yet, courts have mostly refused to grant restitution to employees under
section 502. ' Nevertheless, restitution is a remedy in equity. "' Restitution
concerns "the recapture of a benefit conferred on the defendant by the
plaintiff... [and] recoveries that are measured by the amount of a
defendant's unjust enrichment."' 99 Moreover, with restitution, the
"defendant's benefit is often measured by the plaintiff's costs." 200 Perhaps,
in denying employees restitution, courts are overlooking the benefits that
employees confer on employers when using employer-sponsored retirement
plans.
Typically, employers benefit from an employee's use of a retirement
plan. In the case of 401(k) plans, these benefits are obvious. The 401(k)
plans save money for employers that otherwise would use defined benefit
plans because 401(k) plans are cheaper to administer and maintain.20 '
Further, in the case of a 401 (k) plan, employers incur less liability for plan
performance than they would incur using a defined benefit plan. 0 2
Employers also receive special tax benefits for 401 (k) plan investments in
employer stock.20 3 Moreover, in viewing pensions as deferred wages, °4
employers derive motivational benefits from offering 401 (k)plans, as they
would from offering salaries.
Thus, courts should consider ERISA's primary purpose and how
employers benefit from employee participation in a retirement plan when
considering the amount of restitution due an employee following a fiduciary
breach. Inevitably, when a 401(k) plan is involved, the employer will have
materially benefitted from the employee's participation. Courts should be
made aware ofthis. Where employees have lost retirement assets as a result
of a fiduciary breach, attorneys should advocate restitution to deter
196. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
197.
198.
equitable
199.

See supranote 146 and accompanying text.
See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,256 (1993) (finding that restitution is an
remedy); see also Ream v. Frey, 107 F.3d 147, 153 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997).
LoNL. FULLER& MELVINARONEISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACTLAW 330 (6th ed. 1996).

200. Id. at 339.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See supranote 16 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 121-52 and accompanying text.
See Oppel, supra note 193, at Cl.
See supra note 42.
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fiduciaries from engaging in future breaches. Restitution should
approximately equal the extent ofan employer's unjust enrichment, possibly
measured by the reasonable costs of the employee.
In all, courts should seek to resolve pension plan conflicts in ways
consistent with ERISA's primary purpose. Persistent courtroom advocacy
forjudicial adherence to ERISA's primary purpose may be an effective way
to enhance employee retirement security by making it easier to label an
employer as a fiduciary and by permitting an employee to recover
"equitable" damages when retirement assets are lost as a result of a
fiduciary breach. Certain other issues relating to retirement security must
be tackled in the legislature.
B. A Legislative Approach to Retirement Security
1. 401(k) Plan Insurance
Since, in the case of 401 (k) plans, employees bear full responsibility for
accumulating enough retirement assets to retire," 5 employees are protected
by comparatively weak fiduciary rules, 206 and employees' retirement
27
benefits are at least partly determined by factors outside of their control,
insurance is needed to protect the security of retirement assets in 401(k)
plans. However, the PBGC does not provide insurance to employees with
401(k) plans. 8 Congress, at the time it enacted ERISA, likely did not
extend the PBGC to insure defined contribution plans because at the time
ERISA was enacted they were not used as primary retirement plans.20 9 Now
210
that 401(k) plans commonly are used as primary retirement plans,
Congress should amend ERISA to provide insurance to them.21
2. A Repeal of ERISA Section 404(c)
Beyond providing 401(k) plans with insurance, the legislature should
repeal section 404(c) of ERISA. Fiduciary duties are too important in
protecting retirement security to allow employees to go without their
protection. In place of section 404(c), the legislature should require that
employers providing employees with 401 (k) plans ensure that employees
abide by modem portfolio theory. For instance, an employer could offer a

205. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 92-140 and accompanying text.
207. See supranotes 167-72 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
211. See generally Jefferson, supra note 58, at 649-71, for an excellent and detailed
discussion about insuring defined contribution plans.
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401(k) plan that lets employees choose stock portfolios representing
different market segments, and requires that employees invest a certain
percentage of their retirement assets in each market segment.
Under this approach, an employee benefits from having both control
over retirement assets and proper diversification through the application of
modem portfolio theory. Also, provided employers offer and maintain
acceptable 401(k) plans, they still will not have to fear incurring liability
with respect to the investment performance of an employee's 401(k) plan.
Importantly, this approach applies ERISA's fiduciary standards to protect
the retirement security of employees with 401 (k) plans.
3. A Ten Percent Limit on Employer Stock in 401(k) Plans
Finally, the legislature should amend ERISA to prohibit employers from
allowing more than ten percent of the assets in a 401(k) plan to be invested
in employer stock."' 2 This protection has been in place for defined benefit
plans since ERISA's inception.213 Now that the 401 (k) plan is replacing the
defined benefit plan as the premier employer-sponsored retirement savings
Vehicle," 4 the 401(k) plan should also receive this protection.
As evidenced by the Enron debacle," 5 overinvestment in employer stock
is a wide-scale problem that potentially may lead to catastrophic
consequences for unfortunate employees. Thus, by placing a ten percent
limit on the amount of assets a 401(k) plan may have in employer stock,
Congress could help protect retirement assets in 401 (k) plans and deal with
a serious threat to the national interest of preserving retirement.
V. CONCLUSION

Enron revealed that 401(k) plans, as presently constituted, provide
inadequate security to an employee's retirement assets. The problem of
retirement assets receiving insufficient security is not new. In fact, Congress
enacted ERISA because of retirement security concerns. Now, more than
twenty-five years after the enactment of ERISA, the retirement plan
landscape has changed. To comport with its original purposes, the
legislature needs to amend ERISA to reflect these changes. Moreover, the
cause of retirement security needs to be advocated in the courtroom.

212. See generally Collapse of Enron Corp.: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
GovernmentalAffairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of John H. Langbein, Professor, Yale Law
School) (declaring that the law should prevent 401(k) plans from being more than ten percent

invested in employer stock).
213. See supranote 121 and accompanying text.
214. See supranotes 83-86 and accompanying text.
215. See supranotes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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Some people may argue that new 401(k) plan rules will discourage
employers from offering retirement plans. This effect is unlikely. Despite
new 401(k) plan rules, federal tax policy will continue to make it
advantageous for companies to offer retirement plans. Moreover,
retirement plans will continue to provide employers with an effective labor
management tool and a mechanism for attracting labor in the open market.
While employers may opt to restore defined benefit plans in place of their
401(k) plans, this result will only serve to increase employee retirement
security. Many employers, however, will likely continue with their 401 (k)
plans because new regulations are unlikely to be onerous, especially when
compared with the benefits employers receive from 401(k) plans.
Further, some people will argue that new 401 (k) plan rules will restrict
the rights of an employee to "strike it rich. ' 21 6 However, "rich" is not the
name of the retirement game. The tax benefits associated with retirement
plans should not subsidize an employee's gambling of retirement assets in
hopes of becoming rich. Rather, the national interest is in protecting
retirement security. In the wake of the Enron debacle, this is the concern
that should guide the pension reform movement.

216. See Crenshaw, supra note 181, at H04.
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